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I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade there has been vigorous debate about the propriety of
using the mental health system to control those persons who are deemed dangerous
to others.1 Thomas Szasz's position, albeit extreme, has appealed to those (even
within psychiatry) who contend that the criminal justice system, rather than the
mental health system, should take primary responsibility for managing such per-
sons. Szasz writes of "the aggressive, paranoid person, who threatens violence.
Legally, he should be treated like a person charged with an offense; psychiatrically
it would be desirable, of course, if he were not incarcerated in an ordinary jail, but
in a prison-hospital, where he could receive both medical and psychiatric
attention. ' '2
This article examines the legal obstacles that hinder implementation of Szasz's
suggestion to transfer to the criminal justice system responsibility for control of
dangerous persons who are believed to be mentally ill. The issue will be explored
from the perspective of the psychiatric emergency room, the point of entry for
Copyright © 1982 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* The authors wish to express their gratitude to Leslie A. Samolovitch and Linda T. LoCascio for
their assistance in the legal and literary research for this article.
t Assistant Director and Legal Counsel, Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, University of
Pittsburgh.
** Professor of Psychiatry and co-director of the Law and Psychiatry Program, Department of Psychi-
atry, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine.
tt Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Law and co-director of the Law and Psychiatry Program,
Department of Psychiatry, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine and University of Pittsburgh
School of Law.
*** Administrative Specialist, Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, University of Pittsburgh.
1. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF
MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1963); Melick, Steadman & Cocozza, The Medcalisaton of Criminal Behavior
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most violent persons who are funneled into the mental health system. This article
will show that present legal and ethical obligations of care givers in the emergency
setting all but preclude the possibility of shunting violent persons, once they have
been evaluated, out of the system of psychiatric care. Achieving Szasz's goal,
which is to some extent endorsed by many psychiatrists who otherwise repudiate
his ideas, 3 would require either a substantial restructuring of legal controls over
medical care or apre-evaluat'on diversion of dangerous persons to the criminal jus-
tice system.
In order to develop this argument, this article will: (1) consider the problem of
evaluating potential dangerousness as seen in the psychiatric emergency room, (2)
develop a typology of dangerous persons who are seen in that setting, and (3)
explore the legal duties that force the mental health system to retain responsibility
for controlling dangerous persons once an evaluation has been performed.
II
THE SPECTER OF VIOLENCE TOWARD OTHERS IN THE EMERGENCY
ROOM
Although for many years it was argued that the mentally ill are no more dan-
gerous to others than are nonmentally ill persons, lately there has been some
reevaluation of this position. As summarized by Steadman, 4 and Rabkin, 5 several
research studies have recently found that the arrest rate of ex-mental patients is
now greater than that of the general population. For example, a 1978 New York
study conducted by Steadman, Cocozza and Melick (Steadman study) found that
ex-mental patients were about three times more likely than the general population
to be arrested for crimes of violence. 6
The great majority of mentally ill persons do not behave violently towards
others,' but a minority of such persons do. The Steadman study found that, fol-
lowing discharge from psychiatric institutions, 1.7% of patients were arrested for
violent crimes over a nineteen-month period.8 Some institutions or mental health
personnel must assume responsibility for the immediate management of far higher
proportions of violent mentally ill persons. 9 Pepper, in discussing the changing
climate in the arena of community treatment, especially problems in treating
younger, more difficult patients who are no longer chronically hospitalized in state
hospitals, notes that of 100 such patients recently evaluated, fully 10% had been
3. See, e.g., Peszke, Is Dangerousness An Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitment?, 132 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 825, 826, 828 (1975); Stone, Comment, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 829, 830 (1975) (comment on Peszke
article).
4. Steadman, Critically Reassessing the Accuracy of Publc Perceptions of the Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill,
22 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 310, 312 (1981).
5. Rabkin, Criminal Behavior of Discharged Mental Patients. A Critical Appraisal of the Research, 86 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULL. 1, 21 (1979).
6. Steadman, Cocozza & Melick, Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Mental Patents: The Changing
Clientele of State Hospitals, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 816, 817 (1978).
7. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, TASK FORCE REPORT NUMBER EIGHT, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF
THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 15 (1974).
8. Steadman, Cocozza & Melick, supra note 6.
9. Skodol & Karasu, Emergency Psychiatry and the Assaultve Patient, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 202 (1978).
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involved with the judicial system because of violent acts.' 0
Two recent articles, one by Monahan, Caldeira and Friedlander (Monahan
study) I I and one by Bonovitz & Bonovitz12 have shown how police, in the exercise
of their discretion, tend to bring to mental hospitals for evaluation and admission
persons who have committed violent acts but who, because they are believed to be
mentally ill, are judged by the police to be more suitable for admission to a hos-
pital than for confinement in prison. As noted by Bonovitz & Bonovitz: "In gen-
eral, police were reluctant to arrest even assaultive mentally ill individuals who
were resistant to treatment. On two occasions the officers went to great lengths to
talk relatives into seeking involuntary civil commitment rather than pressing crim-
inal charges."' 3
Levine, in his review of the records of 100 hospitalized patients, found that
among those who had apparently broken the law prior to hospitalization, a sub-
stantial minority had committed a variety of serious crimes.' 4 Changing commit-
ment laws, under which commitment is increasingly restricted to persons who are
not only mentally ill but who also fit statutory definitions concerning dangerous-
ness to others or self,15 also contribute to a climate in which persons deemed clearly
dangerous and in need of immediate control as well as mentally ill are brought to
psychiatric emergency rooms for evaluation.
10. A Profile of the New Chronic Patients - Young Adults Who Need Continued Rescue, ROCHE REPORT:
FRONTIERS OF PSYCHIATRY, Jan. 1, 1982, at 6 (interview with Pepper).
It is of some interest to note these developments in light of Rabkin's conclusion (on the basis of her
review of virtually all relevant research studies so far performed) that:
At the present time there is no evidence that their [discharged mental patients'] mental status as
such raises their arrest risk; rather, antisocial behavior and mentally ill behavior apparently coexist,
particularly among young, unmarried, unskilled, poor males, especially those belonging to ethnic
minorities ....
The major factor associated with increases in arrest rates of discharged mental patients in recent
years is the increased proportion of mental patients who have arrest histories before their
hospitalization.
Rabkin, supra note 5, at 25.
Others, especially Stephen Morse, have also questioned whether there is scientific data that allows us to
conclude that criminal behavior committed by the mentally ill is, in fact, invariably or causally related to
mental illness. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science." An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 527, 581-90 (1978).
Steadman and his coworkers have argued that the increased arrest rate of ex-mental patients is due to
the changing clientele found in mental hospitals. See Steadman, supra note 6, at 820. Concerning future
risk, the Steadman study found that the ex-mental patients more likely to be arrested following hospitaliza-
tion were those with arrests prior to hospitalization (the larger the number of previous arrests the greater
the risk for subsequent violent arrest), with younger age, and with a diagnosis of drug abuse, alcoholism, or
personality disorder. These types of ex-mental patients were more likely to be arrested than those with
diagnoses such as schizophrenia, neurosis, or organic brain syndrome, illnesses or impairments of a type
that psychiatrists have more traditionally preferred to treat. Id at 817-19.
11. Monahan, Caldeira & Friedlander, Police and the Mentally Ill. A Companson of Committed and Arrested
Persons, 2 INT'L. J. LAw & PSYCHIATRY 509 (1979).
12. Bonovitz & Bonovitz, Diversion of the Mentally Ill into the Crainallustice System." The Police Intervention
Perspective, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 973 (1981).
13. Id at 975.
14. Levine, Cnminal Behavior and Mental Institutionaliation, 26 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 279, 282
(1970).
15. See Practice Manual: State Laws Governing Civil Commitment, 3 MENrr. DISABILITY L. REP. 205 (1979);
Roth, Mental Health Commitment. The State of the Debate, 1980, 31 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 385,
387-88 (1980).
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Thus Monahan, in his recent comprehensive review of the status of clinical
prediction of violent behavior in the mentally ill, has concluded: "The real issue is
. . .what sociological and economic factors underlie the administrative and polit-
ical decision to send more criminals to mental hospitals in the first place."'
16
The argument of Melick, Steadman, and Cocozza is particularly germane to
this paper:
[I]f one is looking for mechanisms entirely within the realm of civil law (to explain the
increased number of offenders in New York State mental hospitals) the emergency commitment
procedures would appear to be the primary mechanisms for admitting persons to state
mental hospitals who could have had criminal charges lodged against them as dangerous,
thus shifting their placement from the criminal justice system to the mental health
system. 17
Thus the psychiatric emergency room is faced with the task of evaluating sub-
stantial numbers of persons who have demonstrated, threatened, or may have the
potential for violent behavior. But not all observers are pleased with the apparent
result, namely, that large numbers of violent or potentially violent persons are
hospitalized in psychiatric facilities. Monahan, Steadman and his colleagues,
Szasz, and even psychiatrists such as Alan Stone' 8 (who argues that some compe-
tent, dangerous, mentally ill persons may not be fit subjects for commitment) sug-
gest that certain persons who are admitted to mental hospitals might instead
better be handled (and possibly treated) by the criminal justice system.' 9
The greatest reason such violent patients pose problems for hospital staff is that
once hospitalized these patients constitute a potential danger to other patients or
to the staff itself. If assaultive in the hospital, they may compromise the treatment
milieu or the hospital's obligation to protect other patients from harm-an obliga-
tion increasingly recognized by the courts as a legal duty of psychiatric hospitals
and staff.20
The attention of those concerned with these issues is appropriately focused on
16. J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 81 (1981).
17. 2 Melick, Steadman & Cocozza, supra note 1, at 234 (emphasis added).
18. Melick, Steadman & Cocozza,supra note 1, at 234; Monahan, supra note 18, at 81; Stone, The Right
to Refuse Treatment." Why Psychiatrists Should and Can Make It Work, 38 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 361
(1981); T. SzAsz, supra note 1, at 226.
19. Many recent articles in the psychiatric literature discuss the problems that mental health per-
sonnel perceive in meeting their increasing burden to manage difficult violent persons who are now evalu-
ated, handled, and treated in mental hospitals. Eg., Edelman, Managing the Vlent Mental Patient in a
Community Mental Health Center, 29 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 460 (1978); Gertz, Training for Preven-
tion ofAssaulive Behavior in a Psychiatnic Setting, 31 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 628 (1980); Hackett,
How to Handle the Violent Patient - And Save Your Own Skin, Too, BEAv. TODAY, Sept. 7, 1981, at 3, 4;
Lehmann, Training in Managing Violent Patients, 33 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 15 (1982); Lion,
Snyder & Merrill, Underreporting of Assaults on Staff in a State Hospital, 32 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
497 (1981); Liss & Frances, Court-Mandated Treatment Dilemmas for Hospital Psyhiaty, 132 AM. J. PSYC I-
ATRY 924 (1975); McDonald, Diagnosis May Give Clue to Danger Potential, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS Oct. 2, 1981,
at 12, 29, 38; Sta# Said to Need Training in Aanaging Violent Patients, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Aug. 7, 1981, at 26,
27.
20. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982); Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d
801, 804 (8th Cir. 1978); Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1123 (1st Cir. 1976); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d
554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502-03 (D. Minn. 1974), affld, 550 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1977); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Appelbaum, Legal Considerations in the Prevention and Treatment of Assaultive Patients, in
ASSAULTS IN PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES (in press).
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the emergency room where dangerous patients are initially evaluated and where
the decision is made to admit or to make alternative dispositions. As a result of
evaluating potentially dangerous persons, emergency room staff may decide to
admit the patient to the hospital (voluntarily or involuntarily) or to outpatient
treatment, to return the patient to the police for arrest or for release, to warn
others including the police of the patient's dangerousness, or conceivably to do
nothing more than to send the person home. After reviewing the variety of clinical
presentations that are likely to be observed in the emergency setting, this article
will consider the difficulties involved in selecting any option that shifts responsi-
bility from the mental health system to the criminal justice system.
III
A TYPOLOGY OF "DANGEROUS TO OTHERS" PERSONS EVALUATED IN
THE EMERGENCY ROOM
Clinicians working in psychiatric emergency rooms are faced with evaluating
what we shall categorize as five types of potentially dangerous persons. Although
there is some inferential support for these categories from the psychiatric literature,
empirical data relevant to making these distinctions in a reliable, valid manner is
neither generally available nor of a type allowing firm conclusions. 2 1 The distinc-
tions drawn here, however, appear to us to be relevant to making clinically sound
and legally supportable dispositions for persons who are considered dangerous to
others. This typology draws upon cases from the Western Psychiatric Institute and
Clinic of the University of Pittsburgh as well as from the experience of others.22
21. See generally J. MONAHAN, supra note 16; Mesnikoff & Lauterbach, The Association of Violent Dan-
gerous Behavior with Pychiatri Disorders." A Review of the Research Literature, 3 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 415, 442
(1975); Morse, supra note 10, at 542-60; Prins, Mad or Bad - Thoughts on the Equivocal Relationship Between
Mental Disorder and Criminality, 3 INT'L. J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 421 (1980); Uhlig, Hospitalzation Experience of
Mentally Disturbed and Disruptive Incarcerated Offenders, 4 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAw 49 (1976).
22. This paper cannot explore in detail the multiplicity of definitional, conceptual, and empirical
problems inherent in the task of predicting dangerousness or in classifying persons as imminently dan-
gerous to others. For a discussion of these issues, see generally J. MONAHAN, supra note 16; Shah, Dangerous-
ness.- Conceptual, Prediction, and Public Poliy Issues, in VIOLENCE AND THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 151 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Shah, Dangerousness]; Shah, Dangerousness. A Paradign for Exploring Some Issues in Law and
Psychiatry, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Shah, Dangerousness." A Paradigm]. The
legal definition of persons as "imminently dangerous to others" for purposes of mental health commitment
will vary according to a given state's statutory definition of dangerousness. This paper is specifically con-
cerned with persons deemed likely to be imminently dangerous to others because they have already com-
mitted a violent act towards other persons, or because they have threatened such an act and it is believed
by mental health personnel that absent mental health treatment (or some other type of handling) such
persons will shortly fulfill their threats.
In assessing a person's "dangerousness to others," clinicians should address the probability of occur-
rence of forthcoming violence and the nature and imminence of the violence towards others. In Penn-
sylvania, for example, clear and present danger to others is shown by: "[E]stablishing that within the past
30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there is a
reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated." Mental Health Procedures Act, PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 50, § 7301(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982-83). The definition of dangerous conduct as provided by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Krol is also helpful: "Dangerous conduct is not identical with
criminal conduct. Dangerous conduct involves not merely violation of social norms enforced by criminal
sanctions, but significant physical or psychological injury to persons or substantial destruction of property."
State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 259, 344 A.2d 289, 301 (1975).
In this article, dangerous behavior is used synonymously with the concept of individual violent
behavior manifested towards others. This article also cannot address in detail how psychiatric emergency
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A. Persons Who Are Dangerous to Others Because of Mental Illness
Despite the unavailability of well-controlled clinical studies on the subject,
most mental health clinicians are familiar with patients who manifest violence
towards others only in the throes of acute psychiatric illness and thus presumably
as a result of that illness. For example, Detre and his coworkers, in delineating a
"nosology of violence," describe one group of violent patients that includes
patients with paranoid schizophrenia (morbid jealousy), schizophrenic or
schizophreniform psychosis, severe manic excitement, and post-partum psy-
chosis. 23 Such patients behave violently towards others but do so only when they
are ill and often in a stereotypic manner. Kermani, in a study of fifty-three hospi-
talized assaultive patients, delineates a somewhat similar group of patients who
reveal no history of sustained violence or of psychopathic-antisocial behavior
occurring independently of mental illness. When violent, these patients appear to
be reacting in response to delusional thoughts. They give few warning signals
before the onset of violent behavior. 24
Although, as Morse argues,25 the above clinical points do not necessarily
negate certain logical problems in attributing patient violence directly (or in a
unicausal way) to mental illness, the "longitudinal" or life history perspective on
these patients renders them, from the perspective of the clinician, reasonable can-
didates for psychiatric hospitalization. The patient's history clearly reveals that
treatment "makes a difference" in the patient's behavior. This is a pragmatic
stance, but it is also one based upon the clinician's perception that to pursue alter-
native dispositions for the patient other than those that involve primarily treat-
room personnel should go about assessing dangerousness, or how to predict that a person will behave in a
manner dangerous towards others. This subject has been comprehensively reviewed recently elsewhere.
See J. MONAHAN, supra note 16.
Although it is sometimes argued that the empirical literature has failed to demonstrate the clinician's
capacity to predict dangerous behavior (at least over the longer term), AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
supra note 7, at 23-26, prediction of imminent dangerousness towards others is a prediction that clinicians
routinely make. This occurs, for example, when certain patients are hospitalized or when, once hospital-
ized, these patients are put into seclusion, are removed from seclusion, or are discharged. As Monahan has
also noted, there is no empirical study that shows clinicians cannot predict violent behavior towards others
over periods of up to several days. Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous
Mentally ill Persons. A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 198, 200 (1978). See also Shah, Dangerousness,
supra, at 160-61, for a critique of the idea that prediction of dangerousness is impossible under all circum-
stances.
The consensus of the recent literature on this subject is that in predicting dangerousness for purposes of
commitment mental health professionals should not focus only upon the patient's present mental status
(e.g., extent of patient agitation, paranoia, delusional ideation, the nature and direction of the patient's
threats), but also upon the circumstances and history of the patient's previous or ongoing violent behavior
and upon the provocations towards violence that now exist or are likely to exist as a function of the
patient's future environment. T. GUTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 58-61 (1982); J. MONAHAN, supra note 16; Roth, Clinical and Legal Considerations in the Therapy of
Violence Prone Patients, in 18 CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC THERAPIES 55 (J. Masserman ed. 1979); Shah, Danger-
ousness: 4 Paradigm, supra. Statistical studies indicate that violent behavior is more likely a function of the
patient's demographic features, e.g., younger age, lower social class, opiates or alcohol user, lower IQ and
educational achievement, residential and employment instability. J. MONAHAN, supra note 16.
23. Detre, Kupfer & Taub, The Aosoloy of Violence, in NEURAL BASES OF VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION
294, 300 (1975).
24. Kermani, Violent Psychiatric Patients. A Study, 35 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 215, 221 (1981).
25. Morse, supra note 10, at 589.
[Vol. 45: No. 3
HOSPITALIZATION, ARREST, OR DISCHARGE
ment for illness would be morally wrong and unfair since the patient manifests
major mental illness and cannot fully control his behavior.
Because controlling the threat posed by this type of patient involves treating
the primary psychiatric condition (treatment usually consisting of antipsychotic or
other psychotropic drugs, psychotherapy, and/or social interventions), such
patients appear to clinicians to be reasonable candidates for mental hospitaliza-
tion. This belief is reflected in a number of empirical studies of the emergency
admission process which demonstrate that the underlying psychiatric disorder
rather than the patient's violent behavior plays the primary role in the decision to
admit. Monahan and Warren, for example, found that only the occasional patient
(less than 5% of patients who are committed to mental hospitals) is committed to
the hospital solely because he or she is "dangerous to others."' 26 This is probably
because such patients are often viewed by clinicians as constituting not only a
danger to others but also a danger to self (often because their aggression is likely to
provoke retaliative assault), or as simultaneously being "gravely disabled." Simi-
larly, Skodol and Karasu found that the physician's decision to hospitalize violent
patients was based not on the history of violent behavior per se but, instead, on the
basis of a diagnosis of schizophrenia or upon recognition by the clinician that the
patient exhibited a major cognitive, perceptual, or behavioral disturbance of a
functional, organic, or toxic nature.2 7 The violent act itself failed to distinguish
between hospitalized and nonhospitalized patients. Of those patients deemed dan-
gerous to others because of mental illness, the cases considered suitable for emer-
gency hospitalization are those in which the clinician believes the illness to be
affecting the patient's rational and executive powers and/or ability to act
autonomously.28
CASE EXAMPLE
A twenty-two year old man with a history of manic-depressive disorder was brought to a
psychiatric emergency room for evaluation. He had not been sleeping and was extremely
angry and irritable. When his brother insisted that he eat and try to sleep, he forcibly
struck his brother with a baseball bat. The patient was uncooperative in the emergency
room and refused to consider taking lithium. He was, therefore, involuntarily committed to
the hospital on an emergency basis.29
B. Persons Who Are Dangerous to Others Because of "Personality Disorders"
Many persons who are a potential danger to others do not suffer from a
psychotic illness but are classified as having "character disorders" or "personality
26. Monahan, Caldeira & Friedlander, supra note 11, at 516; Warren, Involuntary Commitmentfor Mental
Disorder. The Application of California's Lanterman-Petri'-Short Act, 11 LAw & Soc. R. 629, 645 (1977).
27. Skodol & Karasu, Toward Hospitalization Criteria for Violent Patients, 21 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHI-
ATRY 162, 163-64 (1980); But see also Appelbaum & Hamm, Decision to Seek Commitment. Pschiatric Decision
Making in a Legal Context, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 447 (1982).
28. M. PESZKE, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF THE MENTALY ILL: THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY
49-61 (1975); Skodol & Karasu, supra note 9, at 208.
29. See also Good, Prmna y Affective Disorder, Aggression, and Criminality, 35 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
954 (1978).
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disorders."'30 Clinicians and legal experts differ over whether such persons should
be considered "mentally ill" for legal purposes. 31 Mental health clinicians may
not consider personality-disordered persons as proper subjects for emergency
mental hospitalization because their mental disorder is not viewed as a genuine
mental illness. Mental health clinicians believe either that such persons can "con-
trol" their behavior and therefore ought to suffer its consequences or that such
persons are not treatable. These are, however, not always views shared by the
legal system.
Part of the characterization problem derives from the variety of ways in which
mental illness is defined in state statutes for purposes of involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization. Historically, terms such as "mental disorder," "mental disease,"
"mental illness," "defect," "impairment," "derangement," or even "insanity" have
been used. 32 Not all these legal terms necessarily correspond to medical terms or to
concepts with which clinicians are familiar. Moreover, while some states, either in
their commitment laws or in their mental health regulations, incorporate medical
definitions of mental illness or disorder, others do not. The statute in Iowa, for
example, defines mental illness quite broadly to mean "every type of mental dis-
ease or mental disorder, except that it does not refer to mental retardation. '33
Other states are less dependent upon medical terms in defining mental illness.
In New York the legal definition of mental illness relies, in a typically circular
fashion, upon the extent or nature of impairment that the person manifests.
Mental illness is statutorily defined as "a mental disease or mental condition which
is manifested by a disorder or a disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judg-
ment to such an extent that the person afflicted requires care, treatment and reha-
bilitation." 34 In Pennsylvania, and in most states, medical and legal concepts are
linked. Only persons who are "severely mentally disabled and in need of imme-
30. Personality disorders are defined as inflexible, maladaptive, enduring patterns of perceiving,
relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself, which are exhibited in a wide range of impor-
tant social and personal contexts and cause either significant impairment in social or occupational func-
tioning or subjective distress. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DSM-III, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 305-330 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III].
31. A well-known case is Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1962). One court deter-
mined that Mr. Williams was unsuitable for civil commitment because he was not mentally ill (a psychia-
trist testified that the patient was not presently psychotic), In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1958),
af'd, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Nevertheless, he was later viewed by several psychiatrists as meeting
the requirement for criminal insanity because he was believed to have a mental disease (sociopathy) which
was productive of his criminal behavior. Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d at 866. See also Blocker v.
United States, 288 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring). When the Department of
Mental Health of the State of Michigan defined mental illness (for purposes of retention in the hospital) as
"a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which significantly impairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life,"
clinicians in Michigan concluded that this definition encompassed mental illnesses such as psychosis, severe
neurosis, or organic conditions but excluded character disorders. Benedek & Farley, The McQuillan Decision:
Civil Rightsfor the Mentall, Ill Ofender, BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAw. 438, 442-43 (1977) (quoting
Mich. Dep't of Mental Health Memorandum). Nevertheless, judges and juries when subsequently making
decisions about who should be released from the hospital construed character disorders as well as psychotic
conditions to be mental illnesses for purposes of retention. Id at 447.
32. Se THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 66-71 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971) (table con-
taining statutory definitions of the mentally ill for all 50 states).
33. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(1) (West Supp. 1982-83).
34. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 1.03(20) (McKinney 1978).
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diate treatment. . . may be made subject to involuntary emergency examination
and treatment. ' 35 Furthermore, "a person is severely mentally disabled when, as a
result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discre-
tion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal
needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to
himself."' 36 Mental illness is then further defined in state regulations to be "those
disorders listed in the applicable APA [American Psychiatric Association] Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual. ' 37 Arizona's statute gives specific attention to this
problem. Arizona defines mental disorder to mean "a substantial disorder of the
person's emotional processes, thought, cognition, or memory." Specifically
excluded from this definition are "[c]haracter and personality disorders character-
ized by life long and deeply ingrained anti-social behavior patterns. '38
The confusion over whether personality disorders constitute mental illnesses for
the purpose of commitment is given particular importance by empirical findings
that a large percentage of prisoners, presumably including most of those convicted
of violent crimes, fall into the personality disorder category and more especially
into the classification of "antisocial personality disorder. ' 39 These findings suggest
that if a broader definition of mental illness including personality disorders were
adopted by emergency room clinicians, a large number of those charged with vio-
lent crimes would be eligible to enter the mental health system. That personality
disorders are frequently treated as mental illnesses is demonstrated by an Iowa
study that reported forty-five percent of diagnoses on commitment papers were
"short of psychoses." 4  Monahan, Ruggiero, and Friedlander have recently
reported similar findings from California. 4 1
CASE EXAMPLE
A thirty-four year old drug addict who had a history of armed robbery appeared at the
emergency room demanding methadone because of poor sleep. He was in some distress, was
angry at others, and was distraught because his wife had recently died of a drug overdose.
He was threatening revenge on the drug dealers, and he had a loaded gun. The patient
refused voluntary hospitalization. Eventually the emergency room personnel "talked the
patient down" and persuaded him to give up his gun to them. When the gun was not
returned, the patient became quite angry. After further discussion, however, he agreed to
return to the emergency room for reevaluation in a few days.
Several months later the patient, in a drug-intoxicated state and again carrying a
loaded weapon, was brought by the police to the hospital for involuntary admission.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982-83).
36. Id
37. Admission and Commitment Procedure § 7100.101.3, 9 Pa. Admin. Bull. 317 (1979).
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(17)(c) (Supp. 1981). Arizona's approach to commitment is thus
similar to the ALI approach to specifying criminal insanity. In the well-known "caveat" clause, it is stated
"mental disease or defect" does not include "an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
39. S. GUZE, CRIMINALITY AND PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 42, 87 (1976).
40. Involuntagy Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa. The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64 IOWA L.
REV. 1284, 1379-80 (1979).
41. Monahan, Ruggiero & Friedlander, The Stone-Roth Model of Civil Commitment and the California Dan-
gerouswness Standard- An Operational Comparison, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1267.
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C. Persons with Coexisting Mental Illness and Dangerousness; Causal
Relationship Uncertain
Mentally ill individuals who have a history of violent behavior may not always
manifest that violence as a result of their illness. Psychotic patients, for example,
may continue to be violent even after their psychosis is controlled by medication.
Empirical findings support this conclusion. Thus in their classification of violent
persons, Detre and his group found that the majority of violent individuals had an
early onset of violent behavior. This category includes a number of persons who
can be diagnosed as "antisocial" or "explosive" personalities.4 2
Boyd and Merskey, 43 in related work studying the origin of violence in schizo-
phrenic patients, have found that the personal characteristics of aggressive schizo-
phrenic patients resemble those of violence-prone individuals who are not
mentally ill more closely than they resemble those of nonaggressive schizophrenic
patients. In the experience of Boyd and Merskey, the typical aggressive schizo-
phrenic patient is a young man who has suffered parental brutality, has committed
antisocial acts as a child, has frequently abused alcohol, and has used illicit drugs.
Kermani also distinguishes a group of mentally ill violent patients, some of whom
are psychotic, who are also chronically homicidal and suicidal and whom he labels
"violent, depressive personalities" because they have a long history of antisocial
behavior and a record of repeated imprisonment for violation of the law. 44
Moreover, socio-environmental and other situational factors contributing to
violence among mentally ill persons are identical to factors that provoke or con-
tribute to violence committed by nonmentally ill persons, e.g., the presence or
availability of a lethal weapon.4 5 This reasoning leads to a conclusion that a sub-
stantial portion of the "causes" of violent acts committed by mentally ill persons
are independent of mental illness, even when patients also manifest major mental
illnesses such as schizophrenia.
Followup studies, tracking mentally abnormal offenders after institutional
release, including persons who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI), support this idea. These studies demonstrate that subsequent failure,
recidivism, and rehospitalization in such patients is predicted by two variables: (1)
the offender's age at release (the younger the offender, the greater the danger) and
(2) the extensiveness of the previous criminal history.46 NGRI offenders more
nearly resemble other offenders than they do typical psychiatric patients.4 7 Curing
the "mad" may not necessarily remove the "bad" or alter the social prognosis.
The epidemiological data discussed by Steadman, Rabkin, and Monahan con-
42. Detre, Kupfer & Taub, supra note 23, at 330.
43. Boyd & Merskey, quoted in Diease Itsef Found Largely Unrelated to Violent Behavior of Schizophrenzcs,
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, May 1979, at 8, col. 1.
44. Kermani, supra note 24, at 216.
45. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 7, at 15-18.
46. Roth, Correctional Psychiarq,, in MODERN LEGAL MEDICINE, PSYCHIATRY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE
677, 700 (1980).
47. Morrow & Peterson, Follow-up of Dircharged Pychiatri' Offeders - "Not Guilty by Reason of Insaniy"
and "Criminal Sexual Psychopaths" 57 J. CRIM. L. & POL. Sci. 31, 34 (1966); Quinsey, Pruesse & Fernley, Oak
Ridge Patients Pr-Release Characteristies and Post-Release Adjustment, 3 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAw 63, 73 (1975).
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cerning recidivism in mental patients48 also tend to support the idea that there is a
group of patients in which mental illness and a tendency to violent behavior (on
the basis of socio-demographic features or other factors) coexist.
The problem for psychiatry in hospitalizing such patients, even when they are
mentally ill, is that although mental illness in such patients may be treated, future
violence may not necessarily be prevented. This raises some question about the
appropriateness of mental hospitalization for these patients as a response to vio-
lence, at least to the extent that the need for mental hospitalization is predicated
solely or largely upon the expectation that hospitalization will decrease subsequent
violent behavior or improve the patient's social adjustment.
On the other hand, since most of these patients carry diagnoses of both
psychotic illness and personality disorders and since the latter can be related to
their violent acts, problems identical to those discussed in the preceding section
arise here. It may be unclear to both clinicians and the legal system whether a
genuine mental illness, even if not the patient's primary illness, is causally related
to the patient's violent behavior. If this question is answered affirmatively, com-
mitment, as with a pure personality-disordered individual, may be justified on
those grounds alone.
An additional problem also arises with this group. In general, the intent of
commitment laws is that patients receive psychiatric hospitalization only when
their dangerousness is believed to be a direct result of mental illness. 49 Indeed, many
state statutes specifically include the words "as a result of mental illness" when
specifying a "dangerousness" requirement for involuntary detention.50 However,
states do not accomplish this in a clear manner. Patients deemed suitable for hos-
pitalization may be described in a conjunctive manner as those both mentally ill
and dangerous. 51 Despite the literature discussed above, it is of course often not
clear to emergency room clinicians whether a patient's dangerousness is a direct
"result of mental illness" or is merely conjoined with mental illness. The practical
effect of this problem is that, even though patient dangerousness and mental illness
may coexist, and not be causally related, such persons frequently are hospitalized
rather than arrested or jailed.
CASE EXAMPLE
After striking his father while in an angry, suspicious state, a nineteen year old patient
diagnosed as having schizo-affective schizophrenia was committed to the psychiatric hos-
pital. He was treated with antipsychotic drugs and rapidly became nonpsychotic. Shortly
before discharge and without warning, the patient became angry. He bit a nurse in the
breast, leading to his "temporary" transfer to long-term care. Staff viewed the patient's
48. Monahan & Steadman, Crime and Mental Disorder. An Epidemiological Approach, in CRIME AND JUS-
TICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH (in press); Rabkin,supra note 5, at 24-25; Steadman, supra note
4, at 312.
49. Postel, Civil Commitment.- A Functional Analysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 48 (1971).
50. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02(1 1)(Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 37.1-67-3 (Supp. 1982);
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.05. 240 (West Supp. 1982). See also, Practise Manual: State Laws Governing
Civil Commitment, 3 MENT. DISABILITY L. REP. 205 (1979) (chart showing statutes of all fifty states).
51. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(1) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(I)(a) (West Supp. 1982).
See also Practice Aanual, supra note 50.
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violent behavior as "characterologic" in origin. Several months later when the patient was
again brought to the emergency room by the police, there was hesitation and reluctance by
the emergency room staff to admit the patient to the hospital. Even though he was again
psychotic and had recently been threatening others, the staff maintained that the hospital
had "nothing to offer" this patient in the way of treatment.
Unfortunately, the value of psychiatric hospitalization in decreasing future vio-
lence when antisocial behavior and mental illness are believed to coexist (even
though not necessarily in a causal relationship) is unproven and inadequately
studied.5 2
D. Persons Manifesting Extreme Dangerousness to Others With or Without
Mental Illness
This type of person, who is usually brought to the emergency room by others,
causes problems in evaluation somewhat different from those in the three previous
categories. The problems for emergency room personnel in making dispositions for
these persons are not so much theoretical as pragmatic. Regardless of the presence
of mental illness, if the crime of which the person is accused is sufficiently violent
or the person is seen as excessively dangerous, then hospital staff are reluctant to
hospitalize the person. Hospitalization means that heightened security must be
provided to guard the person, transforming the ordinary hospital milieu into a
prison; alternatively, the risk of the person perpetrating violence on others once
hospitalized is present. Although such persons often already have had legal
charges brought against them by the police or others, they are sometimes brought
to the hospital without having been formally charged.5 3 Hospital staff may be told
to notify the police or others when the patient is "ready for discharge," presumably
so that others may then detain the patient. As described in the Monahan study,
California commitment procedures include a box on the commitment papers
where police may indicate if they wish to be notified when the patient is dis-
charged from emergency hospitalization so that the police can bring charges. 54
Such extremely dangerous persons are also brought to the hospital for evalua-
tion consequent to making suicidal gestures or threats to the police after having
been taken to jail, or sometimes even on the recommendation of defense counsel-
seemingly for purposes of structuring a legal defense. Some persons in this category
also bring themselves to the emergency room.
CASE EXAMPLES
After being remonstrated by his aunt for drinking too much orange juice, a thirty-eight
year old man who had been somewhat schizoid and withdrawn in his adaption suddenly
and without warning shot both his aunt and his grandparents, cut them up, put them into
52. Rabkin, supra note 5, at 26.
53. If the person is not brought to the emergency room by the police and the authorities have no
knowledge of his criminal act, the obligation of the mental health clinician to report the act to the police
varies according to jurisdiction. Some states require that physicians report crimes when they have knowl-
edge of them. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 486, 403 A.2d 500, 510 (1979); AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMrITTEE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 9C, at 24 (1979).
54. Monahan, Caldeira & Friedlander, supra note 11, at 513.
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plastic bags, and buried the bags in his apple orchard. The patient confessed this homicide
to emergency room staff, also indicating that he was potentially suicidal. Emergency room
staff helped the patient to secure an attorney for himself and obtained the patient's agree-
ment that he would immediately "confess" his crime to the police. With the patient's per-
mission, emergency room personnel then contacted the police to tell them about the
possible crime so that they could begin an investigation.
A thirty-two year old cocktail waitress murdered her lover. She became distraught and
made a serious suicidal attempt in a motel, which led to her admission to a general medical
hospital. Once in the hospital she secured access to a weapon and attempted to shoot a
second person. Arrangements were made by the patient's defense attorney to have the
patient evaluated at the psychiatric hospital for her continuing suicidal potential. The
patient was briefly admitted to the hospital, under police guard, while plans were made to
transfer her as soon as possible to the county jail where she could be further evaluated by a
psychiatrist for possible transfer to a special forensic psychiatric hospital.
E. Persons Who Are Dangerous to Others But Not Mentally Ill
Many persons who are violent to others are not mentally ill. 55 This issue, how-
ever, is quite complicated because it depends upon what nosology or conceptual-
ization of antisocial personality disorder is given credence. The newer DSM-III
formulation of antisocial personality disorder makes resolving this issue particu-
larly problematic. 56 DSM-III relies largely upon a descriptive rather than a psy-
chological (DSM-II) approach to the diagnosis of antisocial personality, thereby
unfortunately obscuring differences that may exist among ordinary criminals, per-
sons who commit instrumental violence, and persons who manifest the full constel-
lation of antisocial traits. However, unless one is willing to assert a tautology, viz.,
that all violent behavior is symptomatic of mental disorder or illness, then clearly
there do exist nonmentally ill persons who act violently towards others. 57
Faced with the prospect of releasing from mental institutions potentially dan-
gerous persons who nevertheless appear free from what has traditionally been
regarded as mental illness, some courts have been willing to assert such tautolo-
gies.58 This issue is under continual discussion in case law relating to whether
medical or legal formulations of mental disorder should be of primary importance
in making release decisions and other types of decisions concerning potentially vio-
lent persons. 59 While a few courts have ruled that persons evaluated by staff as
free from mental illness need not or cannot be civilly committed (even if they have
been dangerous to others or are believed likely to commit violent acts),60 the impli-
55. J. MONAHAN, supra note 16, at 78-79; Mesnikoff & Lauterbach, supra note 21, at 417-21; Roth &
Ervin, Psychiatrnc Care ofFederal Prironers, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 424, 428 (1971).
56. DSM-III, supra note 30, at 320-2 1; Uelman, The Psychiatrist, the Sociopath and the Courts: New Lines
for an Old Battle, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1 (1980).
57. See generally, Postel, supra note 49, at 60-76.
58. See, e.g., State v. Davee, 558 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo. App. 1977); In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 689,
394 N.E.2d 262, 275, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 206 (1979) (Wachtler, J., dissenting); Comment, Reforming Insanity
Defense Procedures in New York. Balancing Societal Protection Against Indiidual Liberty, 45 ALB. L. REV. 679, 691
n.71 (1981).
59. United States v. Harris, Crim. No. F-1976-79 (D.C. Super. Jan. 30, 1981), summarized in MENT.
DISABILITY L. REP. 82 (1981); In re Fleming, 431 A.2d 616, 618 (Me. 1981); Comment, supra note 58.
60. E.g., In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1958); Commonwealth v. Hubert, 494 Pa. 148, 430
A.2d 1160 (1981); Cameron v. State, 37 A.D.2d 46, 51-52, 322 N.Y.S.2d 562, 567 (App. Div. 1971),aj'd, 30
N.Y.2d 596, 282 N.E.2d 118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1972).
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cation of these cases (and related cases and statutes in the area of criminal insanity
and civil commitment)6' for the functioning of clinical emergency room mental
health personnel has yet to be explored.
However, many violent, nonpsychotic persons, especially those with long crim-
inal records, do appear to clinicians to be logical candidates for the criminal justice
system rather than the mental health system, especially when they are brought to
the emergency room by the police. As noted above, at least one state, Arizona,
excludes character pathology in its definition of mental disorder for purposes of
mental health commitment. 62 Other states exclude drug addiction and alcoholism
when these conditions are the sole evidence of mental disorder for purposes of
commitment. 63
IV
OBSTACLES TO THE TRANSFER OF DANGEROUS PERSONS TO THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
It should be evident from the preceding discussion that members of four of the
five categories of dangerous persons who are subject to evaluation in the psychi-
atric emergency room may be appropriate candidates for transfer to the criminal
justice system. This is not to suggest that criminal sanctions necessarily ought to
be employed against dangerous persons who have committed no criminal acts.
Following Szasz, Stone, and others, however, this article assumes that the decision
of whether to apply sanctions is more properly made by the criminal justice system
than by the mental health system. This article now considers the duties of clini-
cians in conducting the emergency evaluation and how those duties and other
legal issues may impede a transfer of responsibility to the criminal justice system.
A. The Duty to Evaluate, Treat, and/or Refer
Hospital and emergency room law indicates that clinicians have a duty to eval-
uate carefully and reasonably the treatment and hospitalization needs of all per-
sons in emergency rooms who are brought to them by others or who come of their
own accord.64 Neither a government hospital or a voluntary hospital with an
emergency room may hold itself out as providing such care and then refuse to
provide it, even if the person appears to be unable to pay.65 The slightest act of
aid or exercise of control over a patient by emergency room staff may create a duty
to exercise reasonable care under all facts and circumstances. 66 All patients who
61. See People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974); In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667,
394 N.E.2d 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192; see also Benedek & Farley, supra note 31; Comment, supra note 58.
62. ee supra note 38.
63. See, e.g., Mental Health Procedures Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
64. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, EMERGENCY CARE AND THE LAW 49-55 (1981); A. SOUTHWICK, THE
LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 182-202 (1978).
65. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Williams v. Hospital Auth.,
119 Ga. App. 626, 168 S.E.2d 336 (1969); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).
66. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957); New Biloxi Hosp., Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss.
185, 146 So. 2d 882 (1962); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, II A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960); Jones
v. City of New York Hosp. forJoint Diseases, 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954),modtfed, 286 A.D. 825, 143
N.Y.S.2d 628 (1955); Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 469, 362 S.W.2d 475, 479 (1961).
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present themselves to the emergency room should, therefore, be seen, examined,
and treated as their condition requires, preferably under the direction of a licensed
physician .67
However, the rendering of emergency care does not commit the hospital to
admit patients when it is not adequately equipped to give them continuing treat-
ment.68 Instead, the hospital is under a positive duty to transfer a patient to
another institution along with appropriate medical information if it does not have
the appropriate facilities to care properly for the patient and if the circumstances
indicate the patient requires transfer. 69 In general, the requirement for transfer
contemplates transfer to another health facility, not transfer to the custody of the
police.
As a result of emergency room evaluations, some mental patients will be hospi-
talized voluntarily; others who meet emergency commitment or detention criteria
of state mental health laws but who resist hospitalization will be admitted involun-
tarily. Still other persons will be determined to be neither foreseeably dangerous
to others or to self' ° nor to require immediate hospitalization for therapeutic rea-
sons. Such persons are usually referred elsewhere to receive later outpatient treat-
ment or may be sent home with no follow-up care whatsoever. Assuming that
mental health clinicians make and carefully document their determinations and
dispositions in accord with usual professional standards, obtaining consultation
where appropriate, they are likely to be judged to have met their duty of care to
the patient or to others. 7
These obligations, which have an ethical as well as a legal basis, are likely to
discourage transfer to the criminal justice system for persons who are mentally ill,
presumed treatable, and dangerous, especially where the causal link between
mental illness and the dangerousness is uncertain.
Although no legal precedents address this point directly, it is arguable that the
clinician violates his duty to care for the person he has evaluated by refusing to
admit him even though treatment is warranted. Although referral to a more
appropriate facility is always an option for the clinician, correctional facilities are
notoriously unlikely to fall into this category. The absence of mental health serv-
ices in most jails and prisons, including the absence of alcohol and other drug
detoxification programs, contributes to the emergency room clinician's reluctance
to refer dangerous-to-others patients to correctional rather than to medical set-
tings. 7 2 Given the dismal history of correctional psychiatry, 73 it is also unlikely
67. A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 64, at 188, 191, 194.
68. Id. at 193.
69. See Carrasco v. Bankoff, 220 Cal. App. 2d 230, 33 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1963).
70. See generally supra note 22.
71. See B. FURROW, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 23-31 (1980); A. SOUTHWICK, rupra note 64,
at 194-95. See generally M. MANCINI & A. GALE, supra note 64.
72. Should the person be so referred, information about his or her condition should be given to the
police for transmission to the jail psychiatrist so that the patient's treatment needs may be met in jail or
elsewhere. Information concerning the patient's recent history, present medications, and suicide or homi-
cide potential is especially important. Some jurisdictions now have special, mental health units in jails such
as the one recently created at the Allegheny County Jail (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) as a result of the
decision in Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Owens-El v.
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that meaningful or sustained efforts to treat mentally ill persons in jails or prisons
will be implemented.
Although the person's dangerous behavior might better be dealt with in the
criminal system, the presence of treatable mental illness may lead clinicians to
focus on that aspect of the person's condition and to accept the patient into the
psychiatric hospital. This is especially likely to occur when the person is desirous
of receiving care. Even when the patient does not desire care, the clinician, whose
personal bias and legal obligation will be to treat, will unconsciously perceive a
causal link between dangerousness and illness that may not be clearly present.
B. The Duty to Protect Third Parties From Dangerous Persons
The duty to protect others from dangerous persons might be expressed in two
ways: an affirmative duty to commit dangerous persons and a negative duty to
avoid harm to third parties. These will be considered in turn.
1. An A rmatve Duto to Commit Dangerous Persons. Interestingly, there are very few
cases that specifically address the psychiatrist's "duty to commit," and it is debat-
able whether any such duty exists in the law. Mental health statutes are typically
"permissive" rather than mandatory in language; they delineate circumstances in
which the mental health clinician may commit patients deemed dangerous to
others rather than conditions in which patients shall be committed.
In Fahey v. United States 74 a New York District Court reviewed the propriety of
the failure by the Veterans Administration to commit to an institution a schizo-
phrenic veteran who later murdered a young girl. Upon review of the relevant law
the court concluded: "[N]o authority seems to exist whereby any government,
Federal or State, or any individual has been held liable for failure to commit. 75
While Fahey is a twenty-five year old case, it still represents the state of the law on
this subject.
Clinicians may sometimes be liable, however, when they make negligent
release decisions about mental patients who are already hospitalized and who later
harm others.76 Liability may also result when hospitals negligently allow to escape
Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368, 1381-82 (W.D. Pa. 1978). In Allegheny County, a published guide also gives
an overview of the criminal justice and mental health systems, which help clinicians understand patient
flow between the two systems. Task Force on Modifications in Forensic Mental Health Services, A Guide
to the Criminal Justice and Mental Health Systems for the Mentally Ill Offender/Ex-Offender and
Defendant in Allegheny County (available from United Mental Health, Inc., 401 Wood Street, Pittsburgh,
PA, 15222). There is, of course, a growing body of literature about how best to provide mental health
services in jails and prisons. See, e.g., Petrich, Psychiatric Treatment in Jail An Experment b? Health-Care
Dehiery, 27 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 413 (1976); Petrich, Metropohtan Jail Psychiatric Clinic: A
Year's Experience, 31 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 191 (1978); Roth, supra note 46.
In Pennsylvania, mental health regulations specifically permit mental hospitals to share information
about patients with prison or correctional authorities (even nonconsensually) when transfer from hospital
to prison is contemplated and when clinicians determine that release of such information is essential to
ensure continuing adequate care for the patient. Admisston and Commitment Procedures, § 7100.111.2(a)(1), 9
PA. ADMIN. BULL. 320 (1979).
73. Roth, supra note 46, at 678-82.
74. 153 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
75. Id' at 886.
76. See generally Homere v. State, 79 Misc. 2d 972, 361 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Ct. Cl. 1974), aJ'd, 48 A.D.2d
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from the hospital foreseeably dangerous patients who do subsequent harm.77 Nev-
ertheless, these types of cases do not stand for the proposition that clinicians must
initially or uniformly confine all persons who are deemed possibly or foreseeably
dangerous. In 1978 a court of appeals in Ohio reviewed the Western Reserve Psy-
chiatric Habilitation Center's failure to readmit a discharged patient who three
months after being released shot and killed a person. 78 While upholding the
potential liability of the hospital for release of a patient known (or who should
have been known) to be dangerous, the Ohio court rejected "a duty as to readmis-
sion similar to the duty of care in discharging" because this "would in effect
require the admission of all persons suspected by lay people to be dangerous. The
dissimilarities of circumstances and pragmatic effect convinces us that mental hos-
pitals and doctors are not generally under a legal duty to third parties as to deci-
sions not to admit or to readmit a patient.
79
Greenberg v. Barbour,8 0 a 1971 case from Pennsylvania sometimes cited as
delineating a duty for psychiatric clinicians to admit or to control dangerous
mental patients, is ambiguous concerning any so-called "duty to commit." In
Greenberg, an admitting room physician failed to examine a patient after it had
been determined previously, through telephone calls, that the patient was poten-
tially dangerous and should be admitted. The patient subsequently ran away and
injured another. Rather than standing for "a duty to commit," Greenberg suggests
that the court was concerned about the potentially negligent manner in which the
patient was evaluated after having arrived at the emergency room. The patient
was not promptly examined and proper information may not have been trans-
mitted from one physician to another.
One reason a duty for mental health clinicians to commit or admit dangerous
mental patients has not arisen is because courts have concluded that psychiatry is
an inexact science and that outpatient evaluations made prior to mental health
admission do not provide sufficient information upon which to make a reliable
determination of the need for hospitalization. "In most instances, the doctor or
hospital has only the assessment of lay people as to the condition of the 'patient,' as
opposed to the opinions of medical experts after admitting, observing, and exam-
ining the patient.""' Such reasoning, however, may not protect emergency room
clinicians who in fact determine their patients to be dangerous but who then fail to
take any action to prevent the dangerous behavior from occurring.
8 2
Another factor mitigating against the courts' articulation of a clear-cut "duty
to commit" is that such a duty placed upon mental health professionals might be
contrary to public policy because it would result in excessive numbers of commit-
422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1975); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 699 (1971); Roby, Getting Caught in the "Open
Door" Psychiatrists, Patients and Third Parties, 1 MENT. DISABILrry L. REP. 220 (1976).
77. Rum River Lumber Co. v. State, 282 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Minn. 1979).
78. Leverett v. State, 61 Ohio App. 2d 35, 399 N.E.2d 106 (1978).
79. Id at 41, 399 N.E.2d at 110.
80. Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
81. Leverett, 61 Ohio App. 2d at 41, 399 N.E.2d at 110.
82. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychothmerapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358, 375
(1976).
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ments to mental hospitals. State mental health laws therefore typically include
provisions immunizing mental health professionals against potential liability with
respect to commitment and even release decisions (assuming the absence of gross
negligence), thereby encouraging mental health professionals to exercise discretion
in the treatment of the mentally ill.83 For example, when in Tarasoffll 4 the court
articulated a duty for psychotherapists to take steps to protect others from patients
whom they knew or should have known to be dangerous (which duty might
include making. warnings to others or notifying the police), the court also ruled
that the defendants had immunity under state law from suit for their failure to
confine the dangerous person.8 5
In summary, the absence of a duty to commit implies that if the patient's
behavior can be managed through outpatient care (i.e., a reasonable treatment
plan can be formulated and initiated while the patient is still in the emergency
room), then outpatient treatment may suffice. For some patients, outpatient treat-
ment might even be required in accord with the least restrictive alternative doc-
trine.86 Of note here are Levinson and Ramsey's recent empirical findings that the
patient's future environment, including the -stress that the environment places on
the patient, is the key factor relating to the emergence of subsequent violent
behavior.8 7 Assuming the patient is not admitted, the clinician may, therefore, be
obligated prior to the patient's release from the hospital to enlist the patient's
family, friends, and/or other support system members in supporting the treatment
plan. This approach of involving others has the added advantages of sensitizing
them to the patient's potential dangerousness and thus helping them to structure
the patient's future environment to prevent violence from materializing. Potential
victims may be called on the telephone or even summoned directly to the emer-
gency room to engage in therapy with the patient.8 8
2. A Negative Duty to Avoid Harm to Third Parties. Although the courts have failed
to articulate a "duty to commit," evolving tort law doctrines have elaborated a
negative duty to avoid harm to third parties. A recent Nebraska case, for example,
raised the question under the Tarasoffll doctrine of the clinician's duty to confine
in order to avoid harm to others.8 9 In Lipari, a veteran, after having been released
from a mental institution, purchased a shotgun. Shortly thereafter he resumed
83. Roth, supra note 22, at 62.
84. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976).
85. 17 Cal. 3d at 447, 551 P.2d at 351, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (1976).
86. See genera4ly Hoffman & Foust, Least Restnctie Treatment of the Mentally Ill.- A Doctrnne in Search of Its
Senses, 14 SAN D. L. REV. 1100, 1101-22 (1977); Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Analysis and the
Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 375, 400-05.
87. Levinson & Ramsay, Dangerousness, Stress, and Mental Health Evaluations, 20 J. HEALTH & Soc.
BEHAV. 178, 184-85 (1979).
88. Roth & Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 508, 510-
11 (1977); Wexler, Patients, Therapists, and Third Parties: The Victimologial Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT'L. J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 1, 17 (1979).
89. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980). See also a recent case from
California where $282,228 as awarded to a three year old daughter of a woman who was killed by a
veteran who had been evaluated on several occasions at a V.A. hospital. A United States District Court
judge noted the physicians' failures to hospitalize the patient as among the reasons why compensation was
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participation in psychiatric day care treatment at a veterans administration hos-
pital. The day care treatment lasted for approximately one month, after which the
patient ceased treatment against the advice of his doctors. The following month
the patient entered a nightclub and fired a shotgun into a crowded dining room,
killing the plaintiff's decedent, Mr. Lipari, and wounding Lipari's wife. The plain-
tiff alleged that the Veterans Administration was negligent in failing to detain the
patient or in failing to initiate civil commitment proceedings against him. The
district court ruled that it could not say as "a matter of law that a reasonable
therapist would never be required to take precautions other than warnings, or that
there is never a duty to attempt to detain a patient." 9°
Problems arise in applying Lipar:; Tarasof II, and other cases that have
declared a psychiatrist's duty to protect third parties9 ' to the situation of emer-
gency room clinicians whose patients are deemed dangerous to others but not
proper candidates for mental hospitalization. In part, this is because there is con-
tinuing disagreement about the justification for the courts' rulings in these cases.
The courts have relied on different theories to justify why mental health clinicians
are obligated to attempt to protect third parties from expectable violent behavior
committed by patients.
For example, although TarasoffII is usually cited for its conclusion that the
psychotherapist-patient relationship creates a special exception to the general rule
of tort liability that no person has a duty to control the behavior of another,9 2 the
Tarasoff II court failed to explain exactly what it was about the doctor-patient
relationship that gives rise to the clinician's duty.9 3 To the extent that the clini-
cian's duty to take steps to protect others is predicated upon either the authority or
the right that clinicians have to control patients (or upon the fact of control as
already exercised in emergency room evaluations), such circumstances may no
longer exist when, as a result of evaluation, a patient is found not to meet criteria
for mental health commitment because he is not mentally ill and when the patient
then terminates the doctor-patient relationship by refusing further care. In this
regard, it is notable that the TarasoffII court specifically declined to rule whether
"foreseeability alone," absent a therapist-patient relationship, generates a duty for
a therapist to take steps to protect others from the dangerous proclivities of a
patient.94
An alternative theory that may generate a duty for emergency room clinicians
to take steps to prevent dangerous behavior from being manifested by persons
deemed not mentally ill or not suitable for mental hospitalization is provided by
Professor George Dix:
The basic arguments in favor of imposing a duty to warn [protect] upon therapists can be
quite simply stated. Therapists are in a unique position because they can foresee extremely
justified. Jablonski v. United States, No. 79-3504 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (reporter's partial transcript of proceed-
ings) reported in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY NEWSLETTER, May 1981, at 8, 12.
90. 497 F. Supp. at 193.
91. E.g., McIntosh v. Milano, 168 NJ. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
93. Stone, supra note 82, at 375 n.70.
94. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr at 23.
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dangerous conduct on the part of their patients. Consequently the law should provide an
incentive for them to anticipate such conduct, and, when it is anticipated, to take reason-
able steps to prevent it. 9
5
Granting that clinicians have problems in predicting future violence, it can be
argued that when mental health clinicians do in fact determine a person to be
presently dangerous to others (even if not mentally ill), they ought to act upon
such information. The moral duty gives rise to a legal duty.96
The court's decision in McIntosh v. Milano is also instructive here.9 7 McIntosh,
more clearly than Tarasoffi, predicates the clinician's duty to act not only on the
fact of the therapist-patient relationship, but also on the historical duty of the
medical profession to protect the public welfare as, for example, in preventing the
spread of infectious disease. By similar reasoning, emergency room physicians are
in a position to protect the general public from dangerous persons who confess
crimes or from persons with "character disorders" who are not suitable for mental
health treatment but who are, nevertheless, imminently dangerous to others. Fur-
thermore, although some case law suggests that there is no duty to protect others
when the potential victim is unknown, 98 these precedents may not apply when the
clinician has knowledge about whom the patient's victim may be.
It should be evident how these obligations inhibit the transfer of dangerous,
nonmentally ill persons, dangerous, character-disordered persons, and dangerous,
mentally ill persons with uncertain causal links to the criminal justice system. As
the TarasoffI holding made clear, the obligation to protect third parties may
devolve upon the clinician, regardless of intervention or nonintervention by the
police. 99 The initial decision of the police to bring the person to the hospital
rather than to jail is, however, often predicated upon police judgment that, for this
person, handling by the mental health system is more appropriate than handling
by the legal system.10° Even when reinvolved, the police are often reluctant to
arrest. 1 1 Furthermore, in order to avoid embroiling themselves in what in the
future may be complicated and time-consuming judicial commitment hearings,
95. Dix, Tarasoff andthe Duty to Warn Potential Victims, in LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSY-
CHIATRY 118, 138 (C. Hofling ed. 1981).
96. Stone, supra note 82, at 375.
97. 168 NJ. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
98. Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (M.D. Pa. 1981), aj'd, 676 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1982);
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 754, 614 P.2d 728, 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 77 (1980).
99. 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
100. Monahan, Caldeira & Friedlander, supra note 11, at 517.
10 1. The courts are another source of difficulty. There are some reports in the psychiatric literature of
therapists bringing charges against mentally ill persons either because this was felt to be a therapeutic
maneuver for the patient or because it was believed that, even though mentally ill, the patient was able to
control his behavior. See, e.g., Schwarz & Greenfield, Charging a Patient with Assault of a Nurse on a Psychiatnc
Unit, 23 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC A.J. 197 (1978). Courts, however, tend to be skeptical about such a maneuver,
especially if the patient is otherwise judged a candidate for mental hospitalization or if the patient is
already hospitalized as mentally ill. When an attendant at a mental hospital charged a manic-depressive
patient with creating a disturbance at the hospital, the Superior Court of New Jersey declared that:
To convict the involuntary committee of a quasi-criminal offense for displaying the symptoms of his
illness while in a place intended to treat that illness, and upon the complaint of one whose duty it is to
have the care and custody of such a patient, imposes punishment where none can be either constitu-
tionally or morally justified.
State v. Cummins, 168 N.J. Super. 429, 433, 403 A.2d 67, 69 (1979).
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the police often leave the psychiatric emergency room after the person is brought
in for evaluation. The police assume that as a result of the evaluation the patient
will either be hospitalized or the clinician will arrange for an alternative disposi-
tion. Attempting to reinvolve the police in the patient's care, and sometimes even
finding the police to inform them that the patient is not presently ill and does not
qualify for mental hospitalization, can be both time consuming and nonproduc-
tive.10 2 Thus, uncertain of the response of the police to a request for arrest of the
person and aware that often these persons will not have committed chargeable
offenses, the clinician has every incentive to maintain control of the dangerous
person by hospitalizing him.
There is a further disincentive.to cooperating with the criminal justice system
to effectuate a transfer, even when that system may be receptive to the idea.
Agreeing to inform the police of the results of an evaluation leaves the clinician
potentially liable for untoward occurrences should he fail to follow through with
the promised information. 103 This may be the result of a simple lapse of memory,
a concern over the ethical issues at stake, or, most commonly, the transfer of
responsibility for the person from one clinician or facility to another. 0 4 In the last
situation, the failure to communicate the agreement to notify the police to the
receiving clinician, as when shifts change, may give rise to a charge of negligence
should harm occur. Rather than obligating themselves in this way, clinicians may
decide that it is easier simply to avoid contact with the criminal justice system
altogether, thus eliminating one source of potential liability.
C. The Duty to Protect Confidential Communications
In many states emergency evaluations are included in statutory provisions that
guarantee the confidentiality of information gathered in mental health care. 10 5
Tort remedies for breach of confidentiality also exist. 1° 6 In addition, the psychi-
atric profession and other mental health professions have strong statements in their
codes of ethics governing the disclosure of information obtained in confidence. 10 7
102. This may be due, in part, to the negligible risk the police run in such cases. While psychothera-
pists have not always been exonerated from blame when their patients committed violence against others,
the police, government agencies, and others in the criminal justice system have, in recent cases, been
allowed far greater discretion in their action. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 29; Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d at 753, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76;
Buford v. State, 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1980).
103. Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976) (failure
to inform a court, as required by court order, of the transfer of a potentially dangerous person from day
care to outpatient care); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956) (failure to give promised notice
to a detective agency protecting a potential victim that the patient was being released); Williams v. United
States, 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978) (failure of the hospital to give notice as promised to county author-
ities of the discharge and release of a man with known propensity for violence).
104. See Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (failure of evaluating psychiatrist to
give information to a second psychiatrist about an airman's threat to his wife's life).
105. American Medical Ass'n, Confidentiality of and Patient Access to Medical Records, STATE HEALTH
LEGISLATION REPORT, May 1981, at 13-23.
106. Appelbaum, Confidentiality in Pychi'atrc Treatment, in PSYCHIATRY 1982: THE AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REVIEW 328-29 (L. Grinspoon ed. 1982).
107. American Psychological Ass'n, Trncipl.e 5 - Confidentiality, in ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLO-
GISTS 4 (1977); American Psychiatric Ass'n, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4, at 57 (1981).
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Any effort to transfer to the custody of the police without their consent persons
who have been evaluated in an emergency room necessarily involves a massive
breach of confidentiality. Clinicians may be uncertain whether they have the legal
or ethical right to reveal information about a patient's dangerousness to the police,
particularly if no crime has occurred. The above concerns do not mean that clini-
cians, when they view themselves as justified in so doing, lack support for breaking
a person's confidences or initiating steps to prevent others from being harmed. 0
Already promulgated ethical codes and guidelines of the American Psychiatric
Association clearly indicate that it is ethically permissible for psychiatrists to take
necessary steps to protect others.10 9 Furthermore, there are recent cases that exon-
erate physicians from having broken the patient's confidentiality when the patient
is determined to be dangerous to himself, others, or others' property.' I°
The APA Board of Trustees has also recently recommended the following addi-
tion to the Principles of Medical Ethics for Psychiatry: "An ethical psychiatrist
may refuse to provide psychiatric treatment to a person who, in the psychiatrist's
opinion, cannot be diagnosed as having a mental illness amenable to such treat-
ment." 1 1  Were such a provision of the psychiatrist's ethical code to become final,
it would heighten rather than lessen uncertainty for psychiatrists who perform
emergency evaluations of potentially dangerous persons, for in rejecting a person
for treatment the psychiatrist may still need to decide what to do next about the
patient's dangerous proclivities.
Unfortunately, the law is not at all clear on this matter. Courts in two states
have rejected the Tarasof II doctrine that mental health professionals' obligation
to protect third parties outweighs their obligation to protect their patients' confi-
dentiality. 11 2 Unable or unwilling to breach confidentiality, or confused about
their ability to do so, yet fearful of the consequences that might ensue from
releasing dangerous persons outright, clinicians have an incentive to take the only
effective measure available to prevent violent acts-hospitalize the dangerous
108. The issue of a clinician's duty to warn potential victims and the resulting problem of breach of
confidence will not be addressed in detail here. Several articles discuss this subject. See, e.g., Kjervic, The
Psychiatric Nurse's Duty to Warn Potential Victims of Homic dal Psychotherapy Outpatients, L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE, Dec. 1981 at 11, 13-14; Knapp & VandeCreek, Tarasoff Five Years Later, 13 PROFESSIONAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 511 (1982); Roth & Meisel, supra note 88; Wexler, supra note 88; Beck, When the Pattent Threatens
Violence- An Empirical Study of Clinical Practice After Tarasoff, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 189
(1982).
Our clinical experience suggests that when information about a person's potential dangerousness is
shared with others, it is best to do so openly in the presence of and/or with the knowledge of the person
who is threatening. Danger may be increased rather than decreased when information about dangerous
persons is given to others behind a person's back. Clinicians should, therefore, be honest and straightfor-
ward in explaining to persons who are dangerous to others exactly why they intend to share information
with others while also obtaining the patient's consent to do this whenever possible. Such an approach
communicates to the dangerous person not only the clinician's legitimate concern for the safety of others,
but also his concern for the welfare of the dangerous person. The therapeutic task is to help the person
recognize that by having divulged information to the clinician or to others, the person has, in effect,
already asked for help in controlling his or her violent behavior.
109. American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 107, § 4(8) at 6.
110. People v. Hopkins, 44 Cal. App. 3d 669, 674, 119 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1975).
111. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N REPORT, Oct. 9, 1981, at 2.
112. Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 727, 415 A.2d 625, 631 (1980); Hopewell v. Adebimpe, 130
PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 107 (1982) (Pa. C. June 1, 1981).
[Vol. 45: No. 3
HOSPITALIZATION, ARREST, OR DISCHARGE
person. This is especially true if the person can be considered to have any
diagnosable mental disorder.
Even those clinicians who are concerned about the use of the psychiatric care
system for the control of dangerous behavior may be reluctant to inform the police
about the person's potential dangerousness. For physicians to attempt to rid
mental hospitals of social control functions by not admitting to the hospital certain
dangerous persons only to attempt to control these persons' dangerous behavior in
other ways (e.g., by having these persons arrested) is somewhat paradoxical. The
clinician has still used his authority and knowledge not to treat but to control.
Psychiatrists are reluctant to turn emergency rooms into screening clinics
wherein dangerous and nontreatable persons are identified for purposes of further
processing under the legal system," l3 possibly violating their privacy rights as citi-
zens. Once more clinicians face a strong temptation to deal with the problem
within the mental health system.
D. Other Legal Problems Impeding Transfer to the Criminal Justice System
Having completed the emergency evaluation and determined that the person
does not meet the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, the clinician's
authority to detain the person further is unclear. Should the person desire to leave,
the basis for detention may be a citizen's arrest. In most states private persons
(emergency room staff) can perform a citizen's arrest if they have reasonable
grounds to believe that a felony has been committed, even though not in their view
or presence, or if a misdemeanor has been committed in their view or presence. 14
"Reasonable grounds" is tested on the basis of what the ordinary, reasonable
person would have perceived in the situation. Private citizens are not held to the
same strict standards to which the police are held. A citizen may act on informa-
tion furnished by an informer without testing the informer's credibility and relia-
bility and without corroborating the information by facts within the citizen's
personal knowledge." 5 Of course, there is no affirmative legal duty for emergency
room staff to initiate a citizen's arrest.
In the interest of staff and other patient safety, care must be exercised in any
attempt to restrain or apprehend the dangerous person. Notifying the police to
apprehend the dangerous person may be the only cautious alternative in initiating
the citizen's arrest. However, notifying the police without apprehension of the vio-
lent person in reality does not serve as a citizen's arrest. Such action merely serves
as a notice to the police that there is probable cause that a dangerous person has
participated in criminal activity and that a citizen is willing to testify as to why he
believes there is probable cause. Citizen's arrest by emergency room staff serves
primarily as an instrument to demonstrate to the police the seriousness of a situa-
113. Gaylin, What's an FBI Poster Doing in a Nieljounal Like That? Th AMA, Ethics, and a New Role for
the Physia'n, HASTINGS CENTER REP., April 1972, at 1.
114. BASSlOUNI, CITIZEN'S ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE
CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 6-8, 23-26, 60-65, 87-95 (1977) (a review of each state's statutory arrest
authority of the private citizen).
115. See id at 36-42.
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tion and the willingness of the people involved to testify during formal
proceedings.
The foregoing discussion should make evident the limitations of the citizen's
arrest as a means of detaining dangerous persons. Those who have committed no
crime and those who admit to misdemeanors such as simple assault but whom the
clinician believes dangerous cannot be detained in this manner. Although in most
cases the clinician who decides to involve the police may be able to do so without
the knowledge of the person under evaluation, if the person discovers that the
police have been summoned and attempts to leave, the legal basis for detaining
him is not apparent.
V
CONCLUSION
This article is an initial attempt to catalog and discuss the many legal, clinical,
and ethical complexities that confront mental health clinicians who evaluate dan-
gerous-to-others persons to determine whether these persons are reasonable candi-
dates for mental hospitalization. The multiplicity of issues that clinicians must
face in making such decisions can sometimes overwhelm the critical faculties of
even the most experienced clinicians.
For dangerous mentally ill or nonmentally ill persons to be sent to jails or
prisons (instead of being hospitalized), emergency room clinicians must overcome
not only difficult problems inherent in the prediction of dangerousness and in
assessing causation of violent behavior but also problems in interpreting legal and
medical definitions of mental disorder. Clinicians must also face practical issues
involved in making transfers to the criminal justice system, problems in avoiding
liability while attempting to reduce the probability that others will suffer future
harm unnecessarily, and problems related to the legal and ethical principles of
confidentiality. In practice these issues often become so complicated that once a
person is brought to the emergency room and is evaluated by an emergency room
clinician as dangerous to others, this person is hospitalized.
Mental hospitalization is the easiest option for clinicians to pursue that will
ensure both treatment for the patient and protection for others. This is true even
when the clinician finds it personally and professionally distasteful to admit the
person to the hospital. Thus as long as family members, police, and even patients
themselves continue to come to mental hospitals with complaints relating to a
person's violent behavior (whether already accomplished or threatened), such per-
sons will continue to be hospitalized, regardless of the criticism that it is not psy-
chiatry's role to perform a social control function. The only effective means of
preventing mental hospitals from fulfilling this role is the attainment of greater
societal consensus that potentially dangerous persons should not be brought to the
mental hospital for evaluation in the first place. To achieve this, a major educa-
tional campaign would have to be mounted to convince both the general public
and the police that persons who manifest dangerous, violent behavior towards
others that does not result from mental illness truly belong in the criminal justice
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system. Realistically, however, such a campaign is likely neither to occur nor to be
effective.
It is unlikely .that there will be many significant reforms in this area of mental
health law, as in most other areas of mental health law, until there is better under-
standing about the fundamental causes of patients' disordered behaviors
(including why persons become violent)." 6 The cry to incarcerate rather than to
hospitalize dangerous-to-others persons brought to the emergency room is in most
instances a cry in the wilderness.
116. Se Roth, supra note 15, at 394-95. Such knowledge should ultimately be coupled with the devel-
opment of more effective intervention strategies for preventing violent behavior.
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